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Abnormal Audit Fees and Audit Quality: 
Initial Evidence from the German Audit Market 
Abstract 
This study investigates the economic auditor-client dependency issue by examining 
the association between abnormal audit fee pricing and audit quality. Our study is the first to 
analyze this phenomenon empirically for the institutional setting of German IFRS firms by 
using a sample of 2,334 firm-year observations for the period from 2005 to 2010. Our empiri-
cal results demonstrate that positive abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with audit 
quality and imply that the audit fee premium is a significant indicator of compromised auditor 
independence due to economic auditor-client bonding. Audit fee discounts generally do not 
lead to a reduced audit effort, or respectively, audit quality is not impaired when client bar-
gaining power is strong. The association of positive abnormal audit fees and audit quality is 
robust to different audit quality surrogates such as absolute discretionary accruals, financial 
restatements, and meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Keywords: Abnormal Audit Fees, Auditor Independence, Auditor-Client Economic 
Bonding, Audit Quality, Earnings Management.  
JEL-Classification: C30, M41, M42 
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1 Introduction 
On October 13, 2010, the EU-Commission published the green paper “Audit policy: 
Lessons from the crises” (EU-Commission 2010). The purpose of this regulatory proposal is 
to provide improvements with regard to statutory audits in the European Union. As one of its 
key elements for strengthening auditor independence, the green paper proposes a regulatory 
change to the European audit market where the assignment, remuneration, and duration of the 
audit engagement should be determined by a third party (for example via a governmental reg-
ulator or institution; EU-Commission 2010, p. 11; Quick 2012). Although this proposed regu-
latory change was not considered in the final proposal for the European Parliament and the 
European Council (EU-Commission 2011), the EU-Commission has set the issue of auditor 
appointment and remuneration of audit services on its future agenda.  
Almost concurrently with these developments, the accounting profession started to in-
vestigate the consequences of abnormal audit fee pricing on auditor independence, and hence 
audit quality. In general and according to prior literature, auditors who receive abnormally 
high audit fees are assumed to have an incentive to allow clients to engage in opportunistic 
earnings management. Economic theory suggests that this relationship holds to the extent that 
the perceived net benefits of the audit engagement are greater than the associated costs (e.g., 
Kinney and Libby 2002). In contrast and assuming that audit fees are a measure of audit ef-
fort1, below-normal audit fees or audit fee discounts might reflect a low level of audit effort 
(Blankley et al. 2012), or respectively, a strong client bargaining power2. Both of these expla-
nations are referred to as audit quality reducing mechanisms.3 
This study contributes to the audit fee literature in several ways. First, prior empirical 
studies in the field of abnormal audit fee pricing provide mixed results (e.g., Mitra et al. 2009; 
Choi et al. 2010; Asthana and Boone 2012; Blankley et al. 2012). Given these mixed results, 
our study provides additional empirical evidence on the fee-quality association. Second, pre-
vious studies in this research area mainly focus on the United States (US) audit market. The 
main focus on the US audit market leaves uncertainties regarding the direction and magnitude 
of the empirical relationship in the German environmental context. These uncertainties arise 
from the different institutional characteristics of Germany in comparison to the US; such as 
(1) the relatively less restrictive auditor’s liability regime, (2) the prevailing two-tier (vs. one-
tier) corporate governance system, (3) the relatively lower disclosure requirements, (4) the 
relatively lower liability standards for issuers (including its directors and accountants) and 
distributors of securities and (5) the relatively lower public enforcement, as well as (6) the 
different prevailing accounting regimes (i.e., IFRS vs. US-GAAP). These different peculiari-
ties have already been highlighted to result in contradicting audit research results (Schneider 
et al. 2006; Pott el al. 2009; Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 2009). Consequently, previous 
US-based audit research studies cannot generally be taken at face value. Rather, separate stud-
ies based on German firm data need to be conducted in order to confirm, or respectively, op-
pose the potential empirical associations of abnormal audit fees and audit quality. Thus, using 
1  Please note that we are not able to measure audit effort directly. However, it is reasonable to assume that 
audit fees are positively correlated with, for example, the working hours of the auditor or the assignment of 
more experienced staff, both signaling greater effort (Asthana and Boone 2012; Blankley et al. 2012; 
Eshleman and Guo forthcoming). 
2  Also, we are not able to measure client bargaining power directly. However, we do think that audit fee 
discounts are correlated with the clients’ ability to exercise bargaining power (Asthana and Boone 2012; 
Eshleman and Guo forthcoming). 
3  Throughout this paper positive abnormal audit fees and audit fee premiums as well as negative abnormal 
audit fees, below-normal audit fees, and audit fee discounts, respectively, are used synonymously. 
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a sample of 2,334 hand-collected firm-year observations for the sample period 2005-2010, our 
study is the first attempt to analyze the adverse audit quality consequences of economic bond-
ing due to abnormal audit fees for the German audit market, thereby also adding initial evi-
dence on this subject to the European audit literature. Third, over and above the great amount 
of empirical evidence with regard to the consequences of non-audit services on audit quality 
(e.g., Ferguson et al. 2004; Larcker and Richardson 2004; Reynolds et al. 2004; Srinidhi and 
Gul 2007; Quick and Sattler 2011), an empirical investigation of the association between ab-
normal audit fees and audit quality is highly relevant, as excessive audit fees might also erode 
audit quality to a great extent (e.g., Choi et al. 2010). This fact might have been especially 
amplified by the changes in audit regulation in Germany in 2005 by the Accounting Law Re-
form Act that restricted many non-audit services in order to strengthen auditor independence. 
As a consequence of this development, the opportunities of clients to economically bond audi-
tors to accept aggressive and questionable accounting practices have been reduced, or they 
might have been reallocated from non-audit services to audit services. Though we do not ex-
amine a possible reallocation of instruments of economic bonding, investigating the actual 
situation of auditor-client dependency through abnormal audit fee payments is certainly of 
similar importance to further shed light on this audit issue. 
We choose Germany as our sample country for the following reasons. First, Germany 
is a country that has an adequate sample size of IFRS accounting data (Ernstberger 2008). 
Second, German publicly traded companies are required to disclose all fees paid to the as-
signed statutory auditor since the fiscal year 2005.4 Third, from an economical point of view 
the German audit market is considered as (one of) the most important audit markets in Europe 
(Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 2009). Thus, the German institutional environment provides 
the greatest number of firm-year observations with audit fee disclosures for Continental Eu-
rope amounting to approx. 20 % of the total European audit market (Heß and Stefani 2012). 
Accordingly, the study results might be relevant for law-makers and commentators in Europe 
(Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 2009). 
To examine the association of abnormal audit fee pricing and audit quality, we pro-
ceed as follows: First and in accordance with prior literature, we estimate a model to come up 
with abnormal audit fees. Second, we calculate two widely common earnings management 
proxies by using the discretionary accruals model of Ball and Shivakumar (2006) and the per-
formance-adjusted modified Jones discretionary accruals model (Dechow et al. 1995). Third, 
the association between positive (negative) abnormal audit fees and discretionary accruals is 
analyzed empirically in order to test the economic auditor-client dependency issue (reduced 
audit effort or client bargaining power explanation, respectively). Fourth, we investigate the 
robustness of our findings by studying the sensitivity of our results to different (positive) ab-
normal audit fee thresholds. Finally, we examine alternative audit quality surrogates such as 
financial restatements, first-time going-concern modified opinions, and (just) meeting or beat-
ing analysts’ earnings forecasts by two cents or less. 
Our results show that positive abnormal audit fees are significantly negatively associ-
ated with audit quality as measured by our discretionary accruals proxies. In contrast, nega-
tive abnormal audit fees generally have an insignificant effect on audit quality. These results 
imply that the audit fee premium is a significant factor in the context of compromised auditor 
independence due to economic auditor-client bonding. Conversely, below-normal audit fees 
do not result in reduced audit effort, or respectively, audit quality does not deteriorate when a 
strong client bargaining power is immanent. Our findings are robust to different threshold 
levels of positive abnormal audit fees. However, we find preliminary evidence for the fact that 
4 In 2009 the audit fee disclosure requirements are adjusted through the Accounting Law Modernization Act. 
After the amendment audit fees have also to be disclosed by major non-listed companies that meet certain 
accounting benchmarks as determined in section 267 paragraph 3 of the German Commercial Code. 
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the German accounting enforcement reform (i.e., introduction of the German Financial Re-
porting Enforcement Panel and the Auditor Oversight Commission, respectively) might have 
abandoned the adverse consequences of excessive audit fee payments. That is, while our re-
sults are robust for the transition period (2005-2007) of the German accounting enforcement 
reform, abnormal audit fees do not affect audit quality for the period of higher regulatory 
strength (2008-2010). Nevertheless, in order to investigate the robustness of the consequences 
of the German enforcement reform on audit quality, future research is necessary. In our final 
tests for robustness using alternative audit quality surrogates, we are generally able to confirm 
that positive abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality. Here, we also 
find evidence that negative abnormal audit fees increase the probability of a financial restate-
ment as well as the likelihood of just meeting or beating the median analysts’ earnings fore-
cast. In contrast, the probability to issue a first-time modified going-concern opinion is not 
affected when above-normal, or respectively, below-normal audit fees are paid.  
In summary, discriminating between positive and negative abnormal audit fees is im-
portant when analyzing the auditor-client dependency issue. Further, alternative audit quality 
measures might result in conflicting results. However, the results could also be biased by en-
dogeneity in general and omitted variables in particular as audit fees, non-audit fess and ab-
normal accruals could be jointly determined (Antle et al. 2006). For example, abnormal ac-
cruals from complex accounting transactions (such as inventory run-ups, mergers and acquisi-
tion, etc.) could cause the company to demand additional audit and/or non-audit services to 
mitigate audit risk. Alternatively and to the extent that our audit fee model does not fully cap-
ture risk characteristics, a risky company might demand higher audit fees but at the same time 
only allow low audit quality.5 As a consequence of the caveats inherent in audit quality stud-
ies such as ours, the research results at hand should be interpreted cautiously.6 
The paper at hand is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical back-
ground and the hypotheses development. Section 3 sets up the research design while section 4 
discusses the sample composition and presents the respective descriptive statistics. In section 
5 we show the empirical results of our study. Section 6 presents additional sensitivity tests as 
well as robustness checks using alternative audit quality surrogates. The final section 7 con-
tains our conclusions and some reflections on the limitations with regard to our research de-
sign.  
2 Background and Hypotheses Development 
According to prior literature, audit firms that receive abnormally high audit fees have 
the incentive to allow clients to engage in opportunistic earnings management (e.g., Kinney 
and Libby 2002; Choi et al. 2010). The reason for this is usually referred to as the economic 
theory of auditor independence (DeAngelo 1981a; DeAngelo 1981b) where the desire to 
maintain a profitable audit engagement with (abnormally) high audit fee payments is traded 
off against the cost associated with a potential litigation and/or reputational damage (Johnson 
et al. 2002).7 To the extent that the perceived net benefits are greater than the associated costs, 
5  We thank the anonymous reviewer for this insight. 
6  As Eshleman and Guo (forthcoming) point out, research should work on developing refined measures of 
audit quality. 
7  The Arthur Anderson - Enron case can be seen as a prime example for the trade-off between economic 
benefits and the desire to uphold a firm’s reputation. Arthur Andersen, a large international audit company 
with a 90-years firm history and total revenues of nine billion dollars had to shut down its business within 
three months after the state attorneys detected irregular auditing practices within the Enron audit engagement 
(Alexander et al. 2002). Kinney and Libby (2002) note in this context that Enron’s actual audit fees paid in 
the fiscal year 2000 were 250 percent of the estimated normal audit fees. 
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the economic bonding effect increases and audit quality simultaneously decreases. Consistent 
with this assumption, Dye (1991) and DeFond et al. (2002) argue that audit quality could be 
impaired when fee rents are paid. Accordingly, while discussing the study of Frankel et al. 
(2002), Kinney and Libby (2002) also note that a strong economic bonding between the audi-
tor and its client will reduce the quality of reported earnings through the auditor's curbed will-
ingness to resist client-induced biases in the accounting figures reported.8 
Besides the existence of audit fee premiums, it is also possible that clients pay less 
than the expected level of audit fees, namely audit fee discounts. When auditors receive ab-
normally negative audit fees, they have fewer incentives to compromise audit quality, as the 
net benefits from the audit engagement do not outweigh the potential cost for an incorrect au-
dit report (e.g., reputation loss, claims for compensation). However, prior studies like Gupta 
et al. (2009) and Blankley et al. (2012) argue that audit quality can be impaired by audit fee 
discounts as audit firms adjust their audit effort, and respectively, their audit procedures 
downwards; i.e., decreasing audit hours, assigning less experienced staff, etc. (Gregory and 
Collier 1996; Eshleman and Guo forthcoming). As an alternative explanation, below-normal 
audit fees might reflect a stronger client bargaining power which, in turn, has been shown to 
be associated with a lower audit quality (Barnes 2004). 
Prior empirical findings with regard to abnormal audit fee pricing and audit quality are 
inconsistent. The study of Higgs and Skantz (2006) find a positive relationship between earn-
ings response coefficients, a measure of perceived audit quality, and abnormal audit fees. In 
contrast the study of Hoitash et al. (2007) provides evidence that audit quality is negatively 
associated with abnormal total fees. However, the authors are unable to find statistically ro-
bust results for abnormal audit and non-audit fees. Accordingly, Hribar et al. (2010) shows 
that unexpected audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality. Further, Gupta et al. 
(2009) find that negative abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality 
while positive abnormal audit fees are an insignificant factor in this context. Contrary to these 
findings, Xie et al. (2010) find that abnormal audit fees are generally not associated with audit 
quality whereas Mitra et al. (2009) show that normal and abnormal audit fees are both posi-
tively associated with audit quality. The study results of Choi et al. (2010) provide evidence 
that audit quality decreases as the magnitude of abnormal positive audit fees increases. But 
then, the authors are not able to find a statistically significant association between negative 
abnormal audit fees and the quality of the conducted audit. In contrast to Choi et al. (2010), 
the study of Blankley et al. (2012) again illustrates that positive abnormal audit fees have a 
positive effect on audit quality, while the study of Asthana and Boone (2012) provides evi-
dence that positive and negative abnormal audit fees are both significantly negatively associ-
ated with audit quality. Finally, Eshleman and Guo (forthcoming) find a positive relationship 
between abnormal audit fees and audit quality. Possible reasons for the mixed findings are 
difficult to resolve as different samples, sample periods, audit quality measures, estimation 
models and control variables are used.9 However, the shift from the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) to the post-SOX regulatory regime seems to generally have strengthened auditor inde-
pendence (Asthana and Boone 2012) while also influencing the magnitude of the relationship 
between financial reporting risk and audit fees. In this context, Charles et al. (2010) show that 
the magnitude of the risk-audit fee relationship has doubled between the pre-SOX and post-
SOX regulatory regimes. 
8  For example, Bedingfield and Loeb (1974) find that disputes over accounting principles are a significant 
factor for clients to change their auditor. 
9  For example, Eshleman and Guo (forthcoming) argue that the mixed findings in this research field are 
primarily caused by the choice of the audit quality proxy. 
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Table 1 presents additional details on the sample period, the sample size, the main au-
dit quality measure as well as the country of investigation of previous literature on the audit 
quality effects of abnormal audit fee pricing. As can be seen there, the majority of prior re-
search studies proxies audit quality via discretionary accruals. Alternatively, financial re-
statements, audit opinions, analysts’ earnings forecasts, earnings response coefficients, fraud 
incidences, or SEC comment letters, respectively, are used as surrogates for audit quality. It 
can also be noted, that 9 out of the 10 studies identified examine the US audit market. The 
remaining study by Xie et al. (2010) provides initial empirical evidence for the Chinese audit 
market. Hence, there is yet no empirical evidence for the European or German audit market, 
respectively.  
[Table 1] 
To add initial evidence in order to close this research gap, our study analyzes the ad-
verse audit quality consequences of economic bonding – due to abnormal audit fees – for the 
German audit market. We find this research focus worthwhile and contributing to current lit-
erature for several important reasons relating to the different institutional characteristics of 
Germany in comparison to the US (where – as discussed above – most of previous research 
has focused on). The individual issues listed below add up to the conclusion that – from an ex 
ante point of view – it remains unclear whether abnormal audit fee pricing within the German 
environmental context is related to discretion within the financial statements, and hence a 
lower audit quality. Also, and as stated in prior literature, the different German audit market 
peculiarities are expected to lead to different audit research results in comparison to prior 
studies from the US (Pott et al. 2009; Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 2009). 
First, an auditor’s liability regime could have a significant impact on the auditor’s net 
economic bonding incentives10 which, in turn, (negatively) affect audit quality. The civil lia-
bility for auditor’s misbehavior is sanctioned differently in Germany and the US. In the Ger-
man environmental context, the liability of compensatory damages is limited to € 4 million,11 
while there is unlimited liability for audit firms in the US (Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 
2009). Moreover, in the US there exist third party liabilities as well as class actions. However, 
in Germany, no third party liabilities arise as a consequence of misbehavior during the audit 
work and class actions are only possible in very few cases (Bigus and Zimmermann 2008).12 
In this context, La Porta et al.’s (2006) liability standard index also implies that the burden of 
proof in auditor litigation cases is much higher in Germany than in the US (Ratzinger-Sakel 
2013). Overall, the auditor’s liability regime in Germany is considered to be less restrictive 
than the one in the US (Gietzmann and Quick 1998; Bigus and Zimmermann 2008; Quick and 
Warming-Rasmussen 2009; Ratzinger-Sakel 2013). As a consequence, the lower litigation 
risk of the auditor within the German environmental context is expected to negatively affect 
10  We define the auditor’s net economic bonding incentives to be the potential rents of compromising audit 
independence (and keeping the mandate) less the potential associated costs of low quality reporting (e.g., 
litigations, reputation loss, etc.). See DeAngelo (1981a; 1981b) for a discussion of the auditor’s trade-off 
between audit rents and independence. 
11  The liability of compensatory damages is limited by the German Commercial Code, section 323, paragraph 2 
to a maximum amount of € 1 million for audits of non-listed companies and to a maximum amount of € 4 
million for audits of listed companies. 
12  Please note that traditional and recent legal practice by the Federal Court of Justice in Germany 
(“Bundesgerichtshof”) points out that section 323 (paragraph 1, sentence 3) of the German Commercial 
cannot be used as the basis for claims by third parties. However, an exception exists if the audit contract 
between the statutory auditor and the client explicitly includes a third party liability clause. In addition, it is 
worth noting that there also exist alternative opinions on the notion whether auditor misbehavior can give rise 
to third party liabilities in Germany. Please refer to Seibt and Wollschläger (2011) for further details. 
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audit quality when the magnitude of positive abnormal audit fees increases. Negative abnor-
mal audit fees might also deteriorate audit quality in the German environmental context as a 
reduced audit effort is likely to result in lower (potential) litigation charges. 
Second, the limited liability corporations in Germany follow a two-tier corporate gov-
ernance structure while in the Anglo-Saxon countries like the US; a one-tier corporate gov-
ernance system prevails. In this context the US one-tier setting is primarily characterized by 
the board of directors (Köhler et al. 2008). In contrast the German two-tier corporate structure 
consists of the executive board (German Stock Corporation Act, section 76) and the supervi-
sory board. The executive board is responsible for strategic and operational decision making, 
while the supervisory board appoints (German Stock Corporation Act, section 84) and moni-
tors (German Stock Corporation Act, section 111) the executive board. Furthermore, the su-
pervisory board represents employees’ interests through the concept of co-determination 
(Tuschke and Sanders 2003) and maintains networks with stakeholders.13 The monitoring task 
of the supervisory board also comprises the examination of the financial statement reporting 
process. Among other things, this examination is supported by the findings and remarks of the 
statutory auditor.14 Thus, the statutory auditor can be seen as a close partner or agent of the 
supervisory board (Köhler et al. 2008; Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 2009). Due to the 
clear segregation of duties with regard to executive power and oversight, we assume that the 
net economic bonding incentives for auditors in a two-tier setting are smaller than in a one-
tier setting where the segregation of duties is not that strong. For example, in the US one-tier 
setting CEO and board chairman position can either be held by two different persons, or re-
spectively, by the same person (Krause and Semadeni 2013). Consequently, we expect the 
German two-tier governance system to positively affect audit quality when positive abnormal 
audit fees are paid. In case of below-normal audit fees, audit quality might also differ system-
atically in the two jurisdictions when the supervisory board or respectively, audit committee 
renegotiates the financial terms of the audit differently; inducing a lower audit quality level 
when the auditor reduces her effort in order to make the audit engagement profitable (Telberg 
2010; Blankley et al. 2012).  
Third, the institutional environment in Germany is significantly different from the one 
existing in the US. For example, La Porta et al. (2006) assesses the institutional setting in 
Germany to be less restrictive with regard to disclosure requirements, liability standards for 
issuers (including its directors and accountants) and distributors of securities, and public en-
forcement.15 In addition, Djankov et al. (2008) finds that legal protection of minority share-
holders against expropriation by corporate insiders is lower in Germany relatively to the US. 
Furthermore and referring to Glaum et al. (2004), the corporate governance and ownership 
system in Germany is classified as an "insider system", which is characterized by a low in-
formation asymmetry between the management and the owner of the cooperation (La Porta et 
al. 1997; Leuz et al. 2003). In this context the study of Leuz et al. (2003) has shown that “out-
                                                            
13  The composition of a supervisory board of a limited liability company in Germany is characterized by 
explicitly involving various stakeholders; e.g., banks, blockholders, employees and/or trade union 
representatives (Hackethal et al. 2005, p. 398–401). In addition, see Lane (2003) and Goergen et al. (2008) 
for a discussion on the differences and the convergence of the German and Anglo-American corporate 
governance model.  
14  It is important to note that the supervisory board of a public limited company is obliged by the German Stock 
Corporation Act (section 124 paragraph 3, sentence 1) to propose a statutory auditor to the shareholders’ 
meeting. After the formal voting of the members of the shareholders’ meeting the supervisory board is also 
entitled to assign the auditor for the upcoming annual financial statement audit (German Commercial Code, 
section 318, paragraph 1, sentence 1; German Stock Corporation Act, section 119, paragraph 1, No. 4 ). 
15  Please note that the public enforcement index equals the average of the following sub-indices: (1) supervisor 
characteristics index; (2) rule-making power index; (3) investigative powers index; (4) orders index; and (5) 
criminal index. 
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sider” economies with relatively dispersed shareholders, strong outside investor protection, 
and large equity markets like the US exhibit lower levels of earnings management than “in-
sider” countries such as Germany with relatively concentrated shareholders, weak investor 
protection, and less developed equity markets (Leuz et al. 2003). According to the aforemen-
tioned study results, we expect the less restrictive institutional environment in Germany – in 
comparison to the US – to increase auditor’s net economic bonding incentives, and thus, 
negatively affect audit quality when positive abnormal audit fees are paid.16 Furthermore, 
negative abnormal audit fees are likely to result in a relatively lower audit quality when being 
reflective of a reduced audit effort or a stronger client bargaining power, respectively.  
Finally, the US accounting regime is based upon the Anglo-American accounting sys-
tem (US-GAAP), while the German accounting system is partially based upon IFRS.17 Prior 
research suggests that the aforementioned accounting systems generally lead to divergent and 
non-comparable accounting figures (Barth et al. 2012). Accordingly, empirical studies which 
are based on archival data from the two prevailing accounting systems might show different 
results. 
In summary and due to the reasons mentioned above, the previous studies conducted 
for the US jurisdiction are not transferable to the unique German institutional setting. Rather, 
separate studies based on German firm data need to be conducted in order to confirm or op-
pose the potential empirical associations of abnormal audit fees and audit quality. Similarly, 
prior contradicting research results in the field of non-audit services and auditor independence 
have been attributed to different legal environments (Schneider et al. 2006; Pott el al. 2009). 
Please note, however, that the concurrent study does not try to disentangle the different pecu-
liarities of the German setting, but instead, tries to gain an overall understanding of the specif-
ic auditor-client dependency issue due to abnormal audit fee pricing in the German environ-
mental context. 
Consistent with the aforementioned arguments and given prior empirical findings, we 
do not know ex ante and for the German institutional setting whether positive abnormal audit 
fees have a negative impact on auditor independence, and hence audit quality. Moreover, we 
are unable to provide a satisfying prediction about the potential audit quality effects of nega-
tive abnormal audit fees in the German environmental context from an ex ante point of view. 
Consequently, we test the following two non-directional hypotheses: 
Hypothesis (1): Positive abnormal audit fees are not associated with audit quality. 
Hypothesis (2): Negative abnormal audit fees are not associated with audit quality. 
16  The German law-maker enacted the Accounting Enforcement Act as of December 15, 2004. The act created 
the basis for the implementation of a two-tier financial reporting enforcement in Germany. In addition the 
German law-maker enacted the Auditor Oversight Law as of December 27, 2004. The act introduced the 
Auditor Oversight Commission (APAK) in Germany, which is among other things responsible for 
disciplinary oversight of German auditors. We are not sure if and how those accounting reforms are 
considered in the study results by La Porta et al. (2006). However, it can be assumed that those reforms have 
improved the public enforcement characteristics in the German institutional setting. Please refer to 
Ernstberger et al. (2012) for further details of the accounting enforcement reforms in Germany. Please also 
note our additional robustness analysis in section 6, on the effects of the regulative changes in the German 
audit environment.  
17  The German law-maker enacted the Accounting Law Reform Act as of December 4, 2004. The act became 
effective for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2005. The act contained the rules for the mandatory 
IAS/IFRS adoption for listed companies in Germany and substantially modified the existing regulations on 
auditor independence. 
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3 Research Design 
3.1 The Model of Abnormal Audit Fees 
Choi et al. (2010, pp. 115-116) define abnormal audit fees as the difference between 
the client’s actual audit fees paid to the auditor (for the annual financial statement audit) and 
the expected normal level of fees that should have been charged for the audit engagement ef-
fort. Based on this definition, audit fees could be separated into two components: (1) normal 
audit fees, and (2) abnormal audit fees. According to the algebraic sign, the latter component 
could further be separated into audit fee discounts or audit fee premiums. Normal audit fees 
are considered to capture the effects of the regular audit effort costs (i.e., personal expenses 
for the audit team, litigation risks, and normal profit margin for the audit engagement (Simu-
nic 1980; Choi et al. 2008; Choi et al. 2009; Mitra et al. 2009), whereas abnormal audit fees 
are determined through a non-transparent, and therefore, unobservable auditor-client agree-
ment (Choi et al. 2010).  
Following Simunic (1980), the recent audit fee literature (Craswell et al. 1995; De-
Fond et al. 2002; Hay et al. 2006; Choi et al. 2010) provides evidence that the demand for au-
dit services is a positive function of the following three audit engagement factors: (1) client 
size, (2) client complexity, and (3) audit engagement specific risk (i.e., both the risk of the 
client and the auditor). Based on the empirical results of the aforementioned studies, we cal-
culate the audit fee model as presented in Equation (1), in which the estimated coefficients are 
used to compute the normal or expected audit fees for each firm-year.18 Then, the abnormal 
audit fees are calculated as the difference between the actual audit fees paid and the normal 
audit fees estimated (Francis and Wang 2005; Mitra et al. 2009). The variables used in Equa-
tion (1) are defined in Appendix 1. 
We include LNTA to proxy for client size. The results of prior empirical audit fee 
studies (e.g., Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006; Hoitash et al. 2007; Choi et al. 2010; Eshleman 
and Guo forthcoming) provide evidence that the level of audit fees is positively associated 
with the size of the audited company. In addition, prior research also suggests that the demand 
for audit services is positively associated with the complexity of the client’s business and au-
dit environment. To proxy for client complexity, we add the variables LNSEG, LNINVREC 
and FOREIGN (Simunic 1980; Hay et al. 2006; Choi et al. 2008; Choi et al. 2010) to Equa-
tion (1).  
We include the variables LAGLOSS, CHGLEVE, ZSCORE, GROWTH, ROE19, 
BTM and ISSUE to control for client-specific risks. For example, when firms face financial 
problems the litigation risk of the auditor is higher than for profitable and/or financially 
healthy clients. To be compensated for the higher risk associated with financially distressed 
mandates, in turn, the auditor is assumed to charge higher fees (Simunic 1980; Pratt and Stice 
18  Throughout this paper, we omit subscripts for the firm and year for the sake of brevity when presenting our 
model equations. 
19   With regard to the study of Hay et al. (2006) the majority of prior empirical audit fee studies used other 
profitability measures (e.g., ROA, etc.). Due to several collinearity issues with other independent control 
variables we decide to use ROE as a proxy for profitability. 
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1994; Simunic and Stein 1996; Hay et al. 2006; Eshleman and Guo forthcoming). Further-
more, we assume that the level of audit fees differs systematically between high growth firms 
and low growth firms (Reynolds et al. 2004; Hay et al. 2006; Choi and Wong 2007; Choi et 
al. 2010). On the one hand, high growth firms can be seen as less risky clients for auditors as 
the growth rates indicate a healthy business environment. On the other hand, particularly fast 
growing firms have to face significant changes in their business organization and the related 
accounting systems, which can often lead to a greater demand for audit services. To capture 
these growth effects, we add the variables GROWTH, BTM and ISSUE to our regression 
model. 
Besides client’s risk characteristics, the audit fee estimation model is also designed to 
capture auditor’s risk characteristics. To control for audit firm size and reputation effects, we 
utilize the binary variable BIG5. Audit fee premiums should be expected when an auditor has 
gained a certain reputational status and is considered to deliver superior audit quality (DeAn-
gelo 1981b; Palmrose 1986a; Craswell et al. 1995; Ireland and Lennox 2002).20 Further, the 
variable INITIAL is added to the model to control for fee-cutting effects at first-year audit 
engagement bids (DeAngelo 1981a; Eshleman and Guo forthcoming). Regardless of the spe-
cific audit pricing practices in the first year of the audit engagement, prior research suggests 
that a change of the audit firm should always be considered in an audit fee estimation model 
(Simon and Francis 1988; Turpen 1990; Deis and Giroux 1996). NAS is another explanatory 
variable, which has been commonly used in previous audit research (Simunic 1984; Palmrose 
1986b; Whisenant et al. 2003). On the one hand, it is argued that the provision of non-audit 
services can lead to lower audit fees because of synergy and knowledge spillover effects 
which both could lead to an increased efficiency in the audit process (Hay et al. 2006; Joe and 
Vandervelde 2007; Quick and Warming-Rasmussen 2009). On the other hand, non-audit ser-
vices could be associated with higher audit fees, because such services may lead to extensive 
changes in a firm’s organization which require additional audit effort (Simunic 1984; Turpen 
1990; Hay et al. 2006). Referring to the study of Hay et al. (2006), we additionally include the 
variables REPORTLAG and BUSY. REPORTLAG is used as an indicator for the efficiency 
of the statutory audit conducted (Hay et al. 2006; Choi et al. 2010), while BUSY controls for 
specific audit pricing practices during the busy season (Hay et al. 2006; Mitra et al. 2009). 
Both variables are expected to be positively associated with LNFEE. In addition, we include 
the binary variable IFRS in order to capture potential first-time IFRS adoption effects on the 
level of audit fees in the German audit market (Bigus and Zimmermann 2009). 
With respect to client complexity, we also add the indicator variables DAX, MDAX, 
SDAX and TECDAX to Equation (1). These individual indicator variables take the value of 1 
if the sample firm is respectively listed in one of the four indices of the Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change. Due to the structure of the capital market and the related public disclosure require-
ments, it can be assumed that the audit of these companies is more complex, and thus, more 
costly than for (smaller) non-index firms (Köhler et al. 2010). Finally, the audit fee estimation 
model contains 10 industry indicator variables as defined by Frankel et al. (2002) and modi-
fied by Ernstberger et al. (2013).21 The model is estimated using industry-fixed effects as well 
as year-fixed-effects in order to control for potential industry- and year-heterogeneity. 
20  Given the German audit market peculiarities, we define the following audit firms to be Big 5 auditors: 
KPMG, Ernst & Young, Deloitte, PWC, and BDO. 
21  According to Ernstberger et al.’s (2013) German setting modification of Frankel et al.’s (2002) industry 
membership, the classification is defined by SIC code as follows: agriculture (0100-0999), mining and 
construction (1000-1999, excluding 1300-1399), consumer manufactures (2000-2111, 2200-2799), 
chemicals, pharma, and refining (1300-1399, 2800-2824, 2830-2836, 2840-2899, 2900-2999), durable 
manufactures (3000-3999, excluding 3570-3579 and 3670-3679), transportation (4000-4899), utilities (4900-
4999), retail (5000-5999), services (7000-8999, excluding 7370-7379), and computers (3570-3579, 3670-
3679, 7370-7379). 
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3.2 Models of Earnings Management 
Audit quality is not directly observable (Asthana and Boone 2012). Therefore and in 
accordance with prior research, we primarily focus on common proxies for earnings manage-
ment as our audit quality measures (Lim and Tan 2008; Davis et al. 2009; Choi et al. 2010; 
Asthana and Boone 2012).  
For our study we estimate two popular discretionary accrual models in order to deter-
mine audit quality: (1) the model of Ball and Shivakumar (2006), and (2) the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al. 1995). Both models are widely used in auditing and accounting research 
studies (e.g., Choi et al. 2010). As suggested by McNichols (2000) and Kothari (2001), we 
also control for firm performance in the modified Jones model by using the ROA variable, as 
non-discretionary accruals are highly correlated with past and current firm performance.22 
Moreover, we estimate both of the models for the full sample of German listed firms by year 
and for each industry (Choi et al. 2010; Asthana and Boone 2012; Ernstberger et al. 2013) us-
ing a total of 2,838 firm-year observations (results are available upon request). Thereby, we 
require a minimum of ten observations for all year-industry combinations. 
The Ball and Shivakumar (2006) model as well as the performance-adjusted modified 
Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) are illustrated in Equation (2) and, respectively, Equa-
tion (3) below. 
where for client firm i in year t, the variables are defined in Appendix 1. Our discre-
tionary accrual measures (i.e., |DA1| and |DA2|) are derived from the absolute value of the 
residuals (εi).  
3.3 Measuring the Association between Abnormal Audit Fees and Earnings 
Management 
To test our two hypotheses described in section 3, we posit the following regression 
model in Equation (4) linking the magnitude of unsigned discretionary accruals (i.e., |DA1| 
and |DA2|) with our variable of interest: namely abnormal audit fees (ABAFEE). To differen-
tiate the effects of positive abnormal audit fees from negative abnormal audit fees, we use the 
dummy variable DPABAFEE and the multiplicative interaction term PABAFEE 
(DPABAFEE*ABAFEE). The variables used in Equation (4) are defined in Appendix 1.  
Consistent with prior empirical audit fee studies (e.g., Choi et al. 2010; Asthana and 
Boone 2012), a number of independent control variables are added to the model. LNTA is 
included to capture any firm size effects which might be correlated with our earnings man-
22  Please note that the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) model already controls for firm performance by 
incorporating the CFO variable. 
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agement measures. Prior studies find that large firms report a relatively lower level of discre-
tionary accruals in comparison to smaller firms (Dechow and Dichev 2002). It is assumed that 
large listed companies are under increased public, legislative, and accounting research scruti-
ny which curbs the extensive reporting of discretionary accruals (Johnson et al. 2002; Choi et 
al. 2010). Moreover, we add AGE to Equation (4) because long-time existing firms are ex-
pected to have more sophisticated business processes and financial reporting systems in place 
(Johnson et al. 2002). Therefore, we expect that AGE is negatively associated with |DA1| and 
|DA2|, respectively. In addition, we include BTM, GROWTH, ISSUE and CFO to capture the 
consequences of firm-growth and firm performance on earnings management behavior (Beck-
er et al. 1998; Dechow and Dichev 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; Choi et al. 2010). The variables 
LOSS, CHGLEVE, and ZSCORE are added to the estimation model in order to control for 
debt and financial distress (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Choi et al. 2010; Asthana and Boone 
2012). In particular firms with high debt ratios are expected to have greater incentives to im-
prove earnings in order to meet specific debt agreements such as debt covenants or to avoid a 
bankruptcy declaration (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Johnson et al. 2002, Choi et al. 2010). 
Therefore, we assume that all three variables are positively associated with both of the de-
pendent variables. Moreover, BIG5 is used as a proxy for audit firm size (Asthana and Boone 
2012) as previous research in auditing suggests that large audit firms (i.e., Big 4 or Big 5 au-
ditors) are expected to provide higher audit quality than smaller audit firms. Thus, the Big 5 
companies are able to detect and limit the reporting of unusually high (discretionary) accruals 
(Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Choi et al. 2010). Referring to the study of DeFond 
and Subramanyam (1998), we also include the binary variable INITIAL which takes the value 
of 1 if there is an auditor change in the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Following Reyn-
olds et al. (2004) and Choi et al. (2010), we add lagged total accruals (LAGTACC) to the es-
timation model in order to capture the variation of total accruals over time (Becker et al. 
1998). Finally and consistent with Equation (1), the model is estimated using industry-fixed 
and year-fixed-effects to control for potential industry- and year-heterogeneity, respectively.  
4 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Sample Composition 
Our analyses use data from all German non-financial companies with IFRS 
consolidated financial statements that were listed in the regulated market of the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange between 2005 and 2010.23 The focus on one capital market automatically 
controls for institutional factors such as regulatory and listing requirements, or the 
enforcement system. Furthermore, Germany is a country that has an adequate sample size of 
IFRS accounting data (Ernstberger 2008). To be included in our sample, firms must have 
financial information available (i.e., total assets and net income) in the Thomson Reuters 
Worldscope database. In accordance with other empirical research in this area, all companies 
with the SIC codes 6000 up to 6999 (i.e., banks, insurance companies and financial firms) are 
excluded as the balance sheet structures of these firms are fundamentally different to those of 
non-financial firms and would not allow a comparison. Our initial IFRS sample thus contains 
607 companies. In order to collect audit fee data for these companies, a total of 2,704 audited 
annual reports were retrieved using databases for financial statements (e.g., “www.hv-
info.de”), the firms’ homepages as well as the electronic German company register 
(“www.unternehmensregister.de”). Next, we have to adjust our initial sample for the 
following reasons. First, we exclude 137 firm-year observations due to missing audit fee 
23  The IFRS classification follows Daske et al. (2013). As some regression variables are based on information 
of the previous period, data of the fiscal year 2004 is also included in our analyses. 
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disclosures.24 Second, we reduce the sample by 86 firm-year observations that disclose the 
audit fees paid to the international network of the audit firm but do not provide information on 
the portion of the audit fees paid to the engaged German auditor.25 Thus, we consistently use 
the audit fees paid to the German audit firm that are disclosed as mandated by the German 
Commercial Code (section 314, paragraph 1, No. 9). Third, we delete 17 firm-year 
observations with a shortened fiscal year. Fourth, we do not consider 14 firm-year 
observations due to the fact that these are joint audits. Fifth, we exclude 12 firm-year 
observations because of reporting irregularities; i.e., substantive future restatements of audit 
fee disclosures. Finally, we exclude another 104 firm-year observations due to missing control 
variables for Equation (1) and Equation (4). 
As a consequence of these adjustments, the final study sample contains audit fee 
data of 537 companies or 2,334 firm-year observations.26 Table 2, Panel A summarizes the 
aforementioned sample adjustments and presents the final sample composition derived. Panel 
B indicates the yearly distribution of audit fee observations, while Panel C shows the sample 
of observations according to Frankel et al.’s (2002) industry classification (modified by 
Ernstberger et al. 2013). 
[Table 2] 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in Equation (1) and (4) are presented in 
Table 3. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 percent, and respectively, 99 percent 
level to control for outliers. With regard to the distribution of variables shown in Table 3, it is 
worth noting the following facts. First, the mean (median) values of both discretionary accrual 
measures (i.e., |DA1| and |DA2|) amount to 7.8 (4.7) and 10.0 (6.0) percent of lagged total as-
sets, respectively. Second, after delogging the variables LNFEE, LNTA, and LNSEG on the 
individual firm-year level, it can be shown that the average (median) company in our sample 
paid audit fees of 443 k€ (165 k€), has total assets of € 1,618 Mio. (€ 126 Mio.) and operates 
in 3.6 (4.0) business segments. Other noteworthy aspects of our sample composition are an 
average (median) revenue growth of 12.0 (5.8) percent, an average (median) return on equity 
of 7.9 (9.0) percent, and an average (median) book-to-market ratio of 71.8 (59.9) percent. 
Our sample also shows plausible frequencies for our binary variables. The binary vari-
able for audit fee premiums (DPABAFEE) amounts to 52.1 percent, which shows that our 
sample has an almost equal distribution of firm observations with positive and negative ab-
normal fees, respectively. Moreover, it is also worth highlighting that 26.9 percent of our 
sample firms report a negative net income in the sample period. In addition, 12.0 percent of 
the audit engagements in our sample are first-year mandates, while 64.4 percent are audited 
by a Big 5 auditor. These descriptive figures imply that five large (international) audit firms 
dominate the German audit market and that an auditor change is quite infrequent for listed 
24  The missing audit fee disclosures are mainly related to the alternative fiscal year-end (i.e., not December 31) 
of some companies for which the mandatory fee disclosure requirements were not yet binding in 2005. 
25  This issue is mainly driven by the legal restructuring of KPMG in Europe. In October 2007, KPMG 
Germany, KPMG United Kingdom and KPMG Switzerland merged to form KPMG Europe LLP. During the 
period under study, the KPMG offices of the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Russia, 
Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait have joined KPMG 
LLP. 
26  The audit fee data was hand-collected by one of the authors as well as by research assistants. All numbers 
were validated by another author, not involved in the initial collection process. 
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clients.27 Next, we note that 87.9 percent of the sample firms have their fiscal year-end during 
December (BUSY). Finally, 8.2 percent of the firm-year observations are first-time IFRS 
adopters.28 
Overall, the descriptive statistics of the remaining control variables are generally com-
parable with those of other German audit fee studies (Bigus and Zimmermann 2009; Köhler et 
al. 2010). 
[Table 3] 
Table 4 presents both the Pearson and the Spearman correlation matrix of the variables 
used in Equation (4). The correlation matrix shows that our audit quality measures (i.e., |DA1| 
and |DA2|) are highly correlated with each other (ρs = 0.4517; ρp = 0.5951). Further, the ma-
trix also displays that ABAFEE is not significantly correlated with |DA1| or |DA2|, respec-
tively. In addition, the majority of the control variables used in Equation (4) is significantly 
correlated with both dependent variables, suggesting a multivariate analysis in order to dis-
criminate their effects on the level of discretionary accruals. 
With regard to the correlations between the control variables used in Equation (4), it is 
worth noting the following: First, LNTA is significantly correlated with AGE (ρs = 0.3144; 
ρp = 0.3535) and BIG5 (ρs = 0.3902; ρp = 0.3851). These correlations suggest that large firms 
have a longer company history and are more likely to hire a Big 5 auditor than a small or mid-
sized company. Second, Table 4 shows that LOSS is significantly correlated with ZSCORE 
(ρ s= 0.4084; ρp = 0.4378) and CFO (ρs = -0.4434; ρp = -0.3323). This correlation highlights 
the obvious fact that firms which report a negative net income are more likely to go bankrupt 
as well as to suffer from lower (negative) levels of operating cash flows. Finally, ZSCORE 
and CHGLEVE are also significantly positively correlated with each other (ρs = 0.2711; 
ρp = 0.3991). 
To conclude, the Pearson-Spearman correlation matrix implies that the estimated 
models are unlikely to suffer from multicollinearity problems. 
[Table 4] 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Results for the Model of Abnormal Audit Fees  
Table 5 presents the results obtained by estimating our audit fee model in Equa-
tion (1). The model is estimated using a pooled sample29 of 2,334 firm-year observations over 
27  It is important to note, however, that the audit market concentration is lower in comparison to many other 
countries (for example, the BIG4 control approx. 80 % of the US audit market). See Asthana and Boone 
(2012), Table 3. 
28  A majority of German listed companies used an option enacted by the Capital Raising Act in 1998 to prepare 
the annual consolidated statement in accordance with IFRS (or US-GAAP) instead of German GAAP before 
2005. As a consequence, Germany is a country where a considerable amount of IFRS annual financial 
statements is available for a relatively long time period (Ernstberger 2008). 
29  We use a cross-sectional estimation approach where we cluster heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors on 
the firm-level. The cross-sectional estimation approach follows prior literature such as Choi et al. (2010), 
Asthana and Boone (2012), and Blankley et al. (2012). Please note that a firm fixed effect estimation could 
result in an understatement of the true standard error when the residuals of a given firm are correlated across 
years for a given firm (Petersen 2009). In addition, a pooled estimation approach generally increases the 
statistical power in comparison to firm fixed effect computations. 
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a six year period (2005-2010), and includes industry- as well as year-fixed-effects.30 The fit-
ted values of this regression help us to separate the normal audit fee component from the ab-
normal audit fee component.31 
As can be seen in Table 5, 12 out of 21 explanatory variables are significantly associ-
ated with the dependent variable LNFEE, thereby explaining a significant portion of the total 
variation (adjusted R2 of 81.9 percent).32 Moreover, the coefficient signs of all statistically 
significant variables are in line with our expectations, and hence, with prior research (e.g., 
Hay et al 2006; Choi et al. 2010). Accordingly, it can be concluded that our audit fee model is 
appropriate to determine abnormal audit fees. 
The results in Table 5 provide some additional insights with respect to the German au-
dit market characteristics. First, BIG5 is significantly positively associated with LNFEE. This 
result indicates that Big 5 audit firms are in the position to claim higher fee rates than non-Big 
5 auditors.33 In other words, German listed companies are willing to pay for audit quality dif-
ferentiation between Big 5 and non-Big 5 audit firms. In contrast, the coefficient of INITIAL 
is significantly negatively associated with the dependent variable. This negative regression 
coefficient suggests that audit firms in the German audit market systematically offer fee dis-
counts at initial audit engagement bids in order to gain new mandates. The fee-cutting finding 
is supported by empirical evidence of Köhler et al. (2010). Finally, all four index indicator 
variables (i.e., DAX, MDAX, SDAX, and TECDAX) are positively associated with LNFEE. 
As already described above, we assume that the increased disclosure requirements in the pre-
mium indices of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange lead to more (complex) audit procedures 
which, in turn, result in higher audit fee rates (Köhler et al. 2010). 
[Table 5] 
5.2 Testing the Association between Abnormal Audit Fees and Earnings 
Management 
Table 6 provides the results of testing the association between abnormal audit fees and 
earnings management where |DA1| and |DA2|, respectively, are used as the dependent varia-
bles. As explained above, we add the variables ABAFEE, DPABAFEE as well as the interac-
tion term ABAFEE*DPABAFEE (PABAFEE) in order to distinguish the effect of positive 
abnormal audit fees from the effect of negative abnormal audit fees. The overall effect of pos-
itive abnormal audit fees on earnings management is captured by the sum of the two coeffi-
cients of DPABAFEE and PABAFEE, while the single coefficient of ABAFEE represents the 
effect of negative abnormal audit fees on earnings management. 
The results for both of our accrual measures are qualitatively similar. Table 6 shows 
that ABAFEE is neither significantly correlated with |DA1| nor with |DA2|, respectively, indi-
cating that auditors are able to provide an appropriate level of audit quality even when audit 
fees are below the normal level. Moreover, these results imply that low audit fee rates are not 
30  Excluding the industry- and year-fixed effects does not alter our results qualitatively. 
31  Throughout this study the presented t-values are all calculated on an adjusted basis, using robust standard 
errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and firm-level clustering (Petersen 2009). 
32  In comparison, other German audit market studies as for instance Bigus and Zimmermann (2009), Köhler et 
al. (2010) and Wild (2010) show similar adjusted R2 of approx. 82 percent for their audit fee models. 
33  The significant positive coefficient is in line with the study results of Köhler et al. (2010), although the 
authors used the binary variable BIG4 in their research approach. Moreover, the results are partially 
supported by the findings of Wild (2010). The author states that among the Big 4 auditors only PWC is able 
to earn fee premiums in the German audit market. However, the empirical evidence of Wild (2010) cannot be 
taken at face value as the study mainly focus on audit pricing practices after auditor changes. 
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necessarily compensated through a reduction in audit effort. In contrast, the coefficient of 
PABAFEE is significantly positively associated with both dependent accrual variables. More-
over, the sum of the coefficients of DPABAFEE and PABAFEE is also significantly positive-
ly associated with |DA1| (sum of the coefficients = 0.01839; p-value < 0.05; not tabulated), 
and respectively, |DA2| (sum of the coefficients = 0.03423; p-value < 0.01; not tabulated). 
The results support the rejection of our Hypothesis (1). Excessive audit fees payments are an 
important incentive for auditors to allow their clients to engage in opportunistic earnings 
management, thus, decreasing the quality of a firm’s financial statements. Conversely, we 
provide no empirical evidence that audit fee discounts negatively influence audit quality be-
cause of a reduced audit effort, or respectively, a strong client bargaining power. Therefore, 
we are unable to reject Hypothesis (2).  
Besides our variables of interest, Table 6 shows that the majority of the explanatory 
variables are significantly associated with |DA1| and |DA2|, respectively. Since the results for 
both estimation models are qualitatively similar, we focus our discussion on the results re-
ported for the |DA2|-model. As expected and consistent with prior studies (e.g., Johnson et al. 
2002), AGE is significantly negatively associated with |DA2|. In addition, our proxies for firm 
growth and performance (i.e., GROWTH, ISSUE, and CFO) are positively associated with 
our discretionary accruals measure. Moreover and also consistent with previous literature 
(e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002; Choi et al. 2010; Asthana and Boone 2012), our results for 
|DA2| indicate that financially distressed and loss making firms tend to have higher levels of 
discretionary accruals. Consequently, the explanatory variables LOSS and ZSCORE are sig-
nificantly positively associated with the dependent variable. Furthermore, the negative associ-
ation reported for BIG5 implies that large audit firms in the German audit market provide a 
qualitatively higher audit than non-Big 5 auditors. Finally, LAGTACC is significantly nega-
tively associated with |DA2| confirming the need to control for variations in the reversal of 
accruals over time (Choi et al. 2010). 
Overall, the results in Table 6 provide empirical evidence that excessive audit fee 
payments can impair auditor independence and lead to a higher magnitude of discretionary 
accruals, hence a lower audit quality. As a matter of fact, audit fee premiums should be con-
sidered as an important factor in the context of economic auditor-client bonding and the relat-
ed dependency issues. Finally, our empirical evidence for negative abnormal audit fees shows 
that audit fee discounts are a subordinate factor in an auditor-client relationship (e.g., client 
bargaining power) or for the assessment of appropriate audit effort levels by the audit firm. As 
presented above, our results support the empirical evidence of Choi et al. (2010) while being 
in conflict with the findings of Mitra et al. (2009), Asthana and Boone (2012), Blankley et al. 
(2012), and Eshleman and Guo (forthcoming). 
[Table 6] 
6 Additional Tests for Robustness 
Since our proxy for abnormal audit fees is still likely to be subject to misspecification, 
some of the results reported in the aforementioned section could be affected by measurement 
error. Thus, we perform a variety of robustness checks to strengthen the confidence in our re-
sults. 
First, we further investigate the relationship of positive abnormal audit fees and audit 
quality by conducting a sensitivity analysis where we re-estimate Equation (4) for different 
threshold levels of positive abnormal audit fees (i.e., 1 percent, 2 percent, 5 percent, and re-
spectively, 10 percent of total audit fees). The estimation is intended to account for the fact 
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that there could be a normal range instead of a normal level of audit fee pricing. Consequent-
ly, we deem to reveal whether an increase in positive abnormal audit fees results in a system-
atic decrease in the quality of the audit conducted. That is, we hypothesize that audit quality is 
a decreasing function of the abnormal audit fees paid to the statutory auditor. Table 7 demon-
strates the results of these procedures for |DA1|, while Table 8 presents the results for |DA2|. 
As can be seen in Table 7, the coefficient for ABAFEE is insignificant for all of our four audit 
fee thresholds. In accordance with our main analysis above, abnormal audit fees have an in-
significant impact on audit quality when ABAFEE is < 0, or respectively, below the respec-
tive thresholds (i.e., within some “normal” range34). In contrast, the results for all specifica-
tions of PABAFEE are significantly positively associated with |DA1|. In Table 8, we find 
ABAFEE to be insignificant for the 1 percent audit fee threshold. However, for higher ab-
normal audit fee thresholds (i.e., 2 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent of total audit fees, re-
spectively) ABAFEE shows a significantly negative association with |DA2|. This provides 
some evidence for a positive effect of audit fee pricing within a certain “normal” range. 
Again, the results for all PABAFEE threshold specifications are significantly positively asso-
ciated with our discretionary accruals metric. Overall, we can derive the following conclu-
sions from these sensitivity analyses: We confirm that audit quality is a decreasing function of 
the abnormal audit fees paid. In other words, audit quality is especially impaired when posi-
tive abnormal audit fees are high. For positive abnormal audit fees that exceed 10% of total 
audit fees, the magnitude of the association with |DA1| is greater than for the lower abnormal 
audit fee thresholds. With respect to |DA2|, we are even able to observe a monotonic increase 
for the different PABAFEE thresholds specifications. As both discretionary accruals measures 
imply similar directions for the association between positive abnormal audit fees and audit 
quality, we infer that our results are mainly driven by the firm-year observations with higher 
levels of positive abnormal audit fees while the lower levels of positive abnormal audit fees 
have only a moderate effect on the quality of the audit conducted. 
[Tables 7 & 8] 
Second, prior research implies that discretionary accruals are a noisy proxy for audit 
quality (Hoitash et al. 2007, p. 783). That is, the conflicting results of our study and the previ-
ous evidence of Asthana and Boone (2012) and Blankley et al. (2012), respectively, could be 
due to the use of alternative audit quality surrogates. For example, Blankley et al. (2012) used 
financial restatements as the audit quality surrogate, while Asthana and Boone (2012) proxied 
audit quality by the probability of (just) meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts by 
two cents or less.35 In order to investigate whether our empirical findings are robust to alterna-
tive audit quality specifications, we re-estimate Equation (4) using both of the aforementioned 
alternative audit quality surrogates. Furthermore, we follow Ernstberger et al. (2013) and use 
the likelihood to issue going-concern-modified audit reports as an additional audit quality 
proxy, thereby adding initial evidence with respect to the relationship of abnormal audit fees 
and going-concern opinions. To test the association of abnormal audit fees and the alternative 
audit quality surrogates, we posit the regression models presented in Equation (5) and Equa-
tion (6), respectively. In Equation (5), our abnormal audit fee variables are linked to the prob-
ability of a financial restatement (RESTATE)36 as well as to the probability of issuing a first-
34  Please note that we do not try to specifically derive a normal range of audit fee pricing nor to disentangle its 
economic consequences, but leave this promising topic for future research. 
35  Asthana and Boone (2012) used discretionary accruals as an audit quality proxy in their main analysis, too. 
36  The dependent variable RESTATE refers to the publication of error findings established by the German two-
tier enforcement system. The German enforcement system consists of a private review panel, namely the 
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time going-concern modified opinion (FIRST_GCO)37. In Equation (6), ABAFEEE, 
DPABAFEE and PABAFEE are linked to the likelihood of meeting or beating the median 
analysts’ earnings forecast by two cents or less (MBEX). The explanatory variables used are 
identical to Equation (4) except that we have to include the natural log of the number of ana-
lysts' earnings forecasts (LNNFC) and the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
(STDFC) as additional control variables.38 All of the variables included in Equation (5) and 
Equation (6), respectively, are further defined in Appendix 1. 
The results of the aforementioned regression models are presented in Table 9. Overall, 
the multivariate regression analyses show qualitatively similar results for the association of 
positive abnormal audit fees and the probability of a financial restatement as well as the like-
lihood of meeting or beating the median analysts’ earnings forecast by two cents or less; i.e., 
the higher the excessive audit fees paid to the auditor, the lower the quality of the audit con-
ducted. Further and in contrast to the main results of Equation (4), we also find a significant 
association between below-normal audit fees and our alternative dependent variables RE-
STATE and MBEX. That is, the audit quality declines as negative abnormal audit fees in-
crease in magnitude. A detailed discussion of the results in Table 9 follows: First, we note that 
the coefficient for ABAFEE is significantly negative for RESTATE as the dependent varia-
ble. This negative coefficient can be transformed into an odds statistic by taking 100*(eβ-1) 
(Allison 2005, p. 29), which indicates that a 1-unit decrease (i.e., an increase in magnitude) of 
the negative abnormal audit fees is associated with a 189.57 % increase in the predicted odds 
of a financial restatement. Conversely, the coefficient for PABAFEE as well as for the sum of 
the coefficients DPABAFEE and PABAFEE (sum of the coefficients = 1.5404; p-value 
< 0.10; not tabulated) are also significantly positively associated with RESTATE. Here, a 1-
unit increase in the magnitude of positive abnormal audit fees indicates a 366.64 % increase 
in the predicted odds of a financial restatement. Second, we also find a significant relationship 
Deutsche Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung (DPR, German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel), and the 
German securities regulator BaFin (“Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht”). To collect the 
restatement data for our robustness test, we searched the electronic version of the federal registry 
(“elektronischer Bundesanzeiger”). This web-based archive, which is maintained by the federal Ministry of 
Justice, stores filings by German firms and has been the mandatory channel of disclosure since October 2007. 
Please refer to Hitz et al. (2012) and Ernstberger et al. (2012) for further details on the institutional setup of 
the German two-tier enforcement system. 
37  The rationale of using the first-time modified GCO instead of all (subsequent) GCOs issued during the 
sample period is that continuing GCO modifications represent a different set of risks to the auditor and the 
client than a first-time modification (Carey et al. 2008; Mutchler and Williams 1990), because initial audit 
report modifications are the most difficult for a client to accept (Kida 1980). This procedure results in a total 
of 64 first-time GCO observation. 
38 Please note that we drop the independent variable LAGTACC as there is no need to control for variations in 
the reversal of accruals over time in non-accrual based models. 
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between ABAFEE and MBEX as the dependent variable for the sub-sample of firms which 
are followed by financial analysts. The negative coefficient for ABAFEE yields an increase in 
the predicted odds of MBEX of 119.64 % when the negative abnormal audit fees decrease by 
1-unit (i.e., increase in magnitude). Again, the coefficient for PABAFEE, and respectively, 
for the sum of the coefficients DPABAFEE and PABAFEE (sum of the coefficients = 
1.34292; p-value < 0.05; not tabulated) are significantly positively associated with the likeli-
hood of (just) meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts by two cents or less. A 1-unit 
increase in the magnitude of positive abnormal audit fees indicates a 283.02 % increase in the 
respective odds predicted.  
However, the probability of receiving a first-time GCO cannot be explained by the 
level of (positive or negative) abnormal audit fees. This result is consistent with Ratzinger-
Sakel (2013) and again highlights the issue of conflicting results due to the use of alternative 
audit quality measures (Eshleman and Guo forthcoming). 
In summary, we find significant adverse effects for both negative, and respectively, 
positive abnormal audit fees on audit quality for two out of three alternative audit quality sur-
rogates. On the one hand, the results of the aforementioned robustness analyses imply that our 
empirical findings are robust for the audit quality consequences of abnormal positive audit 
fees. On the other hand, our initial results for abnormally negative audit fees seem not to be 
robust with regard to alternative audit quality measures. That is, the alternative audit quality 
surrogates show that auditors do not provide an appropriate level of audit effort when below-
normal audit fees are paid (i.e., client bargaining power is strong). However, we leave the dis-
crimination of the inconsistent results for negative abnormal audit fees (i.e., discretionary ac-
cruals vs. alternative audit quality measures) to future research. 
[Table 9] 
As a third robustness test, we exploit the fact that the German regulatory system was 
affected by major changes during the period from 2005 to 2010. The most important changes 
were the introduction of the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel (FREP – DPR) 
as well as the creation of the Auditor Oversight Commission (AOC – APAK).39 In order to 
investigate whether our results are affected by these German accounting enforcement reforms, 
we conduct subsample analysis for the transition period from 2005 to 2007, and respectively, 
the period of relatively strong regulatory oversight from 2008 to 2010. Our untabulated results 
demonstrate that positive abnormal audit fees are significantly negatively associated with au-
dit quality for the transition period 2005-2007. However, for the period of higher regulatory 
strength (2008-2010), our coefficients for positive abnormal audit fees are insignificant.40 Ac-
cording to Ernstberger et al. (2013) the changing regulatory environment might have motivat-
ed the auditors to expend additional effort during their audits. In our opinion, respectively, the 
auditors’ potential costs of an incorrect audit report (e.g., reputation loss, deprivation of audi-
tors’ certification, claims for compensation, etc.) might have increased so that they outweigh 
the incentives to allow audit clients engaging in opportunistic earnings management. Again, 
we leave this promising avenue of investigation for future research.41 
For our final robustness testing, we re-estimate the regression models using non-audit 
fees and total fees (i.e., the sum of audit fees and non-audit fees), respectively, as previous 
39  Please refer to Ernstberger et al. (2012) for further details as well as capital market consequences of the 
German accounting enforcement reform. 
40  The coefficients for negative abnormal audit fees are insignificant for both of the subsample periods. 
41  These findings are similar to the enhanced auditor independence in the years following the enactment of 
SOX. See Asthana and Boone (2012) for further details. 
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studies have primarily focused on the relative importance of non-audit fees or total fees in-
stead of single audit fees (e.g., Kinney et al. 2004; Hoitash et al. 2007; Lim and Tan 2008; 
Paterson and Valencia 2011). Thus, we use the natural log of non-audit fees and, respectively, 
total fees as the dependent variable in Equation (1). In accordance with our study approach, 
we compute abnormal non-audit fees and abnormal total fees from Equation (1) and test the 
association between the respective fee variables and our earnings management measures ac-
cording to Equation (4). The untabulated results of our robustness-check for abnormal total 
fees provide qualitatively similar results for positive abnormal total fees and |DA1|, whereas 
we are not able to find significant results for the association of positive abnormal total fees 
with |DA2|. The results for the abnormally negative total fee measures are insignificant. Over-
all, the untabulated insignificant results for abnormal non-audit fees are in line with prior non-
audit service studies (e.g., DeFond et al. 2002; Kinney et al. 2004; Larcker and Richardson 
2004).42
7 Conclusions and Limitations 
In this study, we analyze the empirical association between abnormal audit fees and 
audit quality, as measured by discretionary accruals. Consistent with recent literature on audit 
fee pricing, we separate abnormal audit fees into positive, and respectively, negative compo-
nents to better capture the different economic effects of the two fee constructs on audit quali-
ty. Using a sample of 2,334 firm-year observations for the period from 2005 to 2010, our em-
pirical results demonstrate that positive abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with 
audit quality. In contrast, negative abnormal audit fees have an insignificant effect on audit 
quality. Our results imply that the audit fee premium is a significant factor in the context of 
compromised auditor independence due to economic auditor-client bonding. Furthermore, we 
provide evidence that audit fee discounts do not result in a reduction of audit effort, or respec-
tively, audit quality is not reduced when client bargaining power is strong. These findings are 
robust to different threshold levels of positive abnormal audit fees. While our results also re-
main robust for the transition period (2005-2007) of the German accounting enforcement re-
form (i.e., introduction of the German Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel and the Audi-
tor Oversight Commission, respectively), we are unable to find significant results for the peri-
od of higher regulatory strength (2008-2010). However, in order to investigate the robustness 
of the audit quality effect of the enforcement reform, future research is necessary. In that re-
gard it seems important to further shed light on whether and how the changing regulatory en-
vironment might have motivated the auditors to expend additional audit effort. Further, it 
seems worthwhile to investigate whether the auditors’ potential costs of an incorrect audit re-
port (reputation loss, loss of auditors’ certification, claims for compensation, etc.) might have 
increased as a consequence of the changing regulatory environment. 
In additional robustness tests with alternative audit quality surrogates, we are able to 
confirm that positive abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with the quality of the au-
dit conducted. This association holds true for financial restatements and meeting or beating 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. In contrast, however, these alternative audit quality surrogates 
show that auditors are also not in the position to provide an appropriate level of audit effort 
when below-normal audit fees are paid, or alternatively, audit quality seems to be impaired 
when client bargaining power is strong. Again, studies are requested to investigate the reasons 
of the different negative abnormal audit fee effects on the continuous proxy of audit quality 
42  Quick and Sattler (2011) conduct an empirical study of the effects of non-audit services on audit quality for 
the German audit market. Using working capital accruals as a measure of audit quality, the authors find 
insignificant results for both audit-related and tax fees. However, the study provides evidence that other 
(consulting) fees are positively associated with the magnitude of working capital accruals. 
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(i.e., discretionary accruals) in comparison to the respective binary proxies of audit quality 
(i.e., financial restatements, and meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts). As we are 
not able to find an association between the probability of receiving a first-time modified GCO 
and the level of (positive or negative) abnormal audit fees, further investigations are also 
needed here. Summing up, the issue of conflicting results due to the use of alternative audit 
quality surrogates is critical and should be addressed by future research (Eshleman and Guo 
forthcoming). 
Our study adds empirical evidence to the inconsistent and comprehensible range of ex-
isting abnormal audit fee literature, which is mainly concentrated on the US audit market. 
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the effects of abnor-
mal audit pricing on audit quality for the German audit market. From a regulatory perspective, 
our study provides useful insights into the recent debates regarding the economic auditor-
client dependency issue. In the wake of the concurrent discussions of the EU-Commission 
regarding the appointment, remuneration and duration of statutory audits, our results partly 
support the implementation of audit market price controls through a public institution or 
agency as suggested by the European Commission (EU-Commission, 2010, p. 11). However, 
this conclusion is drawn cautiously as it remains subject to subsequent empirical tests to con-
firm the association of abnormal audit fees and audit quality for other European jurisdictions. 
Overall, our empirical evidence should not be taken at face value but rather interpreted 
with caution because the research design is subject to the following limitations. First, our 
main study approach assumes that discretionary accruals are an appropriate measure of earn-
ings management, and thus, are also inversely related to audit quality. Despite the widely ac-
cepted use in prior accounting research, discretionary accruals are often criticized as a noisy 
proxy for the quality of the audit conducted. Though we consider the effects of performance 
differences among firms in our estimations, our results might be subject to measurement error 
rather than a reflection of audit quality. Furthermore, we conduct several sensitivity and ro-
bustness tests to strengthen the confidence in our results. Over and above, our sample covers a 
timeframe affected by significant business and regulatory changes (e.g., mandatory IFRS 
adoption, initial application of audit fee disclosure requirements, financial and economic cri-
ses, etc.) that may lead to a high diversity in audit fee disclosures. We attempt to address these 
issues by hand-collecting our audit fee data, adding year-fixed effects into our regression 
models and conducting several robustness-checks. However, we cannot rule out the possibil-
ity that the fee classifications are subject to systematically biased judgments that may affect 
the results of our study. Third, though we compute abnormal audit fees using an audit fee es-
timation model that appears to be well-specified and in line with the results of prior audit fee 
studies, we cannot rule out the possibility of an unknown degree of model misstatement; i.e., 
due to endogeneity and correlated omitted variables. In particular, audit fees, non-audit fees 
and abnormal accruals could be determined by the same underlying process (Antle et al. 
2006), or respectively, our audit fee model might not be able to fully capture risk characteris-
tics which are correlated with both audit fees and abnormal accruals. Finally, our sample 
composition is based on publicly traded German firms. Therefore, our results may not be gen-
eralizable to non-public companies. Future research should consider this limitation and inves-
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Variable Description
|DA1| - absolute value of discretionary accruals as measured by the Ball and Shivakumar (2006) model.
|DA2| - absolute value of discretionary accruals as measured by the Jones (1991) model specification in Dechow (1995) and adjusted for firm 
performance by including the ROA variable as suggested by McNichols (2000) and Kothari (2001).
ABAFEE - abnormal audit fees estimated from Equation (1).
AGE - number of years since company foundation.
BIG5 - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the auditor is one of the BIG 5 audit firms (KPMG, Ernst&Young, Deloitte, PWC, and BDO), 
and 0 otherwise.
BTM - book-to-market ratio (total book value of equity divided by the firms' market capitalization).
BUSY - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the fiscal year ends in December, and 0 otherwise.
CFO - cash flow from operations scaled by lagged total assets.
CHGLEVE - leverage change from the prior to the current fiscal year, whereas leverage is defined as long-term liabilities divided by total assets.
DPABAFEE - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the abnormal audit fees estimated from Equation (1) are positive, and 0 otherwise.
DAX - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is listed in the DAX index of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise.
DCFO - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the cash flow from operations is negative, and 0 otherwise.
FIRST_GCO - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company received a going-concern modified opinion for the first time, and 0 otherwise.
FOREIGN - ratio of foreign revenue to total revenue.
GROWTH - revenue change from the prior to the current fiscal year.
IFRS - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company applies IFRS for the first time, and 0 otherwise.
INITIAL - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm’s auditor is in the first audit engagement year, and 0 otherwise.
ISSUE - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if equity titles are issued in the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise.
LAGLOSS - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the prior year’s net income is negative, and 0 otherwise.
LAGTACC - prior-year's TACC.
LNINVREC - natural log of inventories and receivables.
LNNFC - natural log of the number of analysts' earnings forecasts.
LNTA - natural log of total assets.
LOSS - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the current year’s net income is negative, and 0 otherwise.
MBEX - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm meets or beats the earnings expectation (proxied by the most recent median consensus 
analyst earnings forecast available on I/B/E/S file) by two cents or less, and 0 otherwise.
MDAX - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is listed in the MDAX index of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise.
NAS - ratio of non-audit fees to total fees.
PABAFEE - positive abnormal audit fees estimated from Equation (1), or respectively, interaction term of ABAFEE and DPABAFEE.
PPE - net property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets.
REC - accounts receivables scaled by lagged total assets.
REPORTLAG - number of days between the fiscal year-end and the audit opinion date.
RESTATE - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the client has issued a financial statement restatement for the respective fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise.
REV - total revenues scaled by lagged total assets.
ROA - return on assets (net income divided by total assets).
ROE - return on equity (net income divided by total equity).
SDAX - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is listed in the SDAX index of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise.
STDFC - standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecasts.
TA - total assets.
TACC - total accruals (net income minus cash flows from operations) scaled by lagged total assets.
TECDAX - indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is listed in the TECDAX index of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise.






Eshleman and Guo (forthcoming) US 2000-2011 4,476 Discretionary accrualsAnalysts' earnings forecasts Abnormal audit fees are positively associated with audit quality.
Asthana and Boone (2012) US 2000-2009 18,873 Discretionary accrualsAnalysts' earnings forecasts Positive and negative abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality.
Blankley et al. (2012) US 2004-2007 5,978 Financial restatement Positive abnormal audit fees are positively associated with audit quality.
Choi et al. (2010) US 2000-2003 9,815 Discretionary accruals Positive abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality. Negative abnormal audit fees are not significantly associated with audit quality.
Xie et al. (2010) China 2002-2008 7,028 Audit opinion quality Abnormal audit fees are generally not associated with audit quality.
Mitra et al. (2009) US 2000-2005 6,852 Discretionary accruals Expected and unexpected audit fees are both positively associated with audit quality. 
Hoitash et al. (2007) US 2000-2003 7,968 Discretionary accrualsAccrual estimation error metric
Abnormal total fees are negatively associated with audit quality. The results for abnormal audit and 
non-audit fees are insignificant.
Higgs and Skantz (2006) US 2001-2002 2,626 Earnings response coefficient Abnormal total and audit fees are positively associated with audit quality. The results for abnormal non-audit fees are inconsistent.
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Unexpected audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality.
Gupta et al. (2009) US 2000-2006 23,372
Going-concern audit opinion
Abnormal discretionary accruals
Other audit quality measures
Negative abnormal audit fees are negatively associated with audit quality. Positive abnormal audit 
fees are not significantly associated with audit quality.
Table 1
Results of Empirical Studies Investigating the Association between Abnormal Audit Fees and Audit Quality








Panel A: Sample Selection Process
Sample Selection Steps Firm-Years Firms
Audited Annual Reports Collected -                                             
for firms having IFRS financial information available in the 
Thomson Reuters Worldscope database (2005 trough 2010); 
excluding SIC Codes 6000-6999
2,704 607         
less:  Missing Audit Fee Disclosures 137
less:  International Audit Fee Disclosures -                                   
(i.e., missing a separate disclosure for the German audit firm) 86
less:  Shortened Fiscal Year 17
less:  Joint Audits 14
less:  Reporting Irregularities 12
less:  Missing Control Variables - Equation (1) and (4) 104
Final Study Sample 2,334 537         








Panel C: Audit Fee Observations by Industry
Industry Classification Firm-Years %
Agriculture (SIC Codes 0100-0999) 14 1%
Mining and construction (SIC Codes 1000-1999, excl. 1300-1399) 63 3%
Consumer manufactures (SIC Codes 2000-2111, 2200-2799) 217 9%
Chemicals, pharma and refining (SIC Codes 1300-1399, 2800-
2824, 2830-2836, 2840-2899, 2900-2999)
155 7%
Durable manufactures (SIC Codes 3000-3999, excl. 3570-3579 
and 3670-3679)
735 32%
Transportation (SIC Codes 4000-4899) 117 5%
Utilities (SIC Codes 4900-4999) 80 3%
Retail (SIC Codes 5000-5999) 142 6%
Services (SIC Codes 7000-8999, excl. 7370-7379) 338 14%
Computers (SIC Codes 3570-3579, 3670-3679, 7370-7379) 473 20%
Table 2, Panel A exhibits the sample selection process taken to derive the final study sample. Please note that the 
audited annual reports were only collected for those firms that have IFRS (consolidated) financial information 
available in the Thomson Reuters Worldscope database for the period from 2005 through 2010. Panel B (Panel C) 




Continuous Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Firm-Years
|DA1| 0.07806 0.10176 0.00000 0.02001 0.04653 0.09453 1.24504 2,334
|DA2| 0.10021 0.12465 0.00006 0.02816 0.06027 0.12247 1.14538 2,334
LNFEE 5.24938 1.11786 3.21888 4.44265 5.10595 5.84064 8.93590 2,334
ABAFEE 0.00000 0.47581 -2.48909 -0.29646 0.03031 0.31294 1.83583 2,334
LNTA 12.04178 2.01842 7.48549 10.68329 11.74489 13.13047 18.42288 2,334
LNSEG 1.10394 0.65535 0.00000 0.69315 1.38629 1.60944 2.39790 2,334
LNINVREC -1.04977 0.92613 -4.21720 -1.47677 -0.91883 -0.57947 2.20013 2,334
CHGLEVE 0.00453 0.13744 -0.55120 -0.03943 -0.00211 0.03899 0.64201 2,334
ZSCORE -1.11182 1.87484 -4.86921 -2.22521 -1.15451 -0.32141 7.82267 2,334
GROWTH 0.11953 0.50211 -0.83424 -0.04618 0.05807 0.17285 4.14211 2,334
ROE 0.07850 0.56849 -2.58886 -0.01105 0.09003 0.19058 3.32768 2,334
BTM 0.71841 0.64196 -1.08508 0.35545 0.59948 0.94937 3.14047 2,334
NAS 0.25275 0.19919 0.00000 0.07658 0.23156 0.39773 0.75124 2,334
REPORTLAG 90.35604 40.92944 19.00 68.00 83.00 106.00 308.00 2,334
CFO 0.09508 0.24802 -0.93577 0.01453 0.07729 0.13780 1.35109 2,334
LAGTACC -0.08185 0.22633 -1.61129 -0.10430 -0.04326 0.00246 0.38947 2,334
Indicator Variables Mean Std. Dev. 0 1 Firm-Years
DPABAFEE 0.52142 0.49965 1,117 1,217 2,334
FOREIGN 0.62339 0.48464 879 1,455 2,334
LOSS 0.26907 0.44357 1,706 628 2,334
LAGLOSS 0.26992 0.44401 1,704 630 2,334
ISSUE 0.29820 0.45757 1,638 696 2,334
BIG5 0.64439 0.47880 830 1,504 2,334
INITIAL 0.12039 0.32549 2,053 281 2,334
BUSY 0.87875 0.32649 283 2,051 2,334
IFRS 0.08226 0.27482 2,142 192 2,334
Table 3 exhibits the summary statistics of the main variables used in our analysis. The audit (non-audit) fee data and the BIG5 indicator variable were hand-




|DA1| |DA2| ABAFEE LNTA AGE BTM GROWTH ISSUE CFO LOSS CHGLEVE ZSCORE BIG5 INITIAL LAGTACC
0.4517 0.0229 -0.1136 -0.0580 -0.1580 -0.0089 0.0818 -0.0156 0.2622 0.0806 0.0899 -0.0267 0.0247 -0.0961
(0.00) (0.27) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.67) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.23) (0.00)
0.5951 -0.0097 0.0136 -0.0575 -0.1095 0.0256 0.0657 0.0011 0.1380 0.0727 0.1205 0.0216 0.0030 -0.0892
(0.00) (0.64) (0.51) (0.01) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.88) (0.00)
0.0075 -0.0082 0.0048 0.0402 -0.0247 -0.0346 0.0038 0.0587 0.0209 -0.0342 0.0104 0.0007 -0.0043 -0.0494
(0.72) (0.69) (0.82) (0.05) (0.23) (0.09) (0.85) (0.00) (0.31) (0.10) (0.62) (0.97) (0.84) (0.02)
0.0277 0.1782 0.0000 0.3144 -0.0441 0.0737 0.0069 0.2559 -0.2493 -0.0479 0.1554 0.3902 -0.1012 -0.0713
(0.18) (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.0501 -0.0155 0.0265 0.3535 0.0259 -0.1054 -0.1352 0.0558 -0.0918 -0.0653 0.1759 0.1420 -0.0358 0.0036
(0.02) (0.46) (0.20) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.86)
-0.1411 -0.1016 0.0000 -0.0468 0.0076 -0.1549 -0.1863 -0.1490 0.0062 -0.0311 -0.1624 -0.0599 -0.0107 0.0800
(0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.02) (0.71) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.77) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00)
0.0397 0.0895 0.0000 -0.0284 -0.0681 -0.0661 0.1614 0.1783 -0.2881 0.0656 -0.1710 0.0159 -0.0131 0.0827
(0.06) (0.00) (1.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.53) (0.00)
0.1013 0.0958 0.0000 0.0157 -0.1225 -0.1672 0.1593 -0.0938 0.0712 -0.0387 0.0190 0.0029 0.0035 0.0300
(0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.36) (0.89) (0.87) (0.15)
0.1150 0.2391 0.0542 0.5007 0.1081 -0.0533 -0.0086 -0.0873 -0.4434 -0.1383 -0.2827 0.1419 -0.0870 -0.1629
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.2125 0.0992 0.0417 -0.2451 -0.0774 0.0367 -0.1255 0.0712 -0.3323 0.3063 0.4084 -0.0538 0.0932 -0.0586
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
0.1209 0.0450 0.0000 -0.1004 -0.0574 -0.1261 0.0689 -0.0315 -0.1696 0.2654 0.2711 -0.0290 0.0253 0.0275
(0.00) (0.03) (1.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.22) (0.18)
0.2325 0.1825 0.0000 0.0055 0.1244 -0.2835 -0.0600 0.0546 -0.2236 0.4378 0.3991 0.0417 0.0644 -0.1320
(0.00) (0.00) (1.00) (0.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.0160 0.0271 0.0000 0.3851 0.1529 -0.0610 -0.0181 0.0029 0.1635 -0.0538 -0.0399 0.0023 -0.0607 -0.0969
(0.44) (0.19) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.89) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.91) (0.00) (0.00)
0.0223 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.1036 -0.0259 0.0002 0.0048 0.0035 -0.0622 0.0923 0.0286 0.0656 -0.0607 -0.0008
(0.28) (0.98) (1.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.99) (0.82) (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.97)
-0.2811 -0.3095 0.0009 -0.2761 -0.0210 0.1151 0.0668 -0.0170 -0.4126 -0.0175 0.0716 -0.1585 -0.0871 0.0178












Pearson-Spearman Correlations among Regression Variables
|DA1| 1.0000
|DA2|













Variables expected sign Coefficient t-statistics
LNTA + 0.44227 *** 22.78
LNSEG + 0.05222 1.76
LNINVREC + 0.03188 1.01
FOREIGN + 0.07118 0.87
LAGLOSS + 0.12259 *** 3.48
CHGLEVE + 0.24052 ** 2.28
ZSCORE + 0.06001 *** 6.52
GROWTH +/- -0.10449 ** -3.14
ROE - 0.03247 1.43
BTM +/- -0.01552 -0.62
ISSUE +/- 0.02283 0.67
BIG5 + 0.11561 *** 4.27
INITIAL - -0.13204 *** -3.82
NAS +/- -0.21006 ** -3.08
REPORTLAG + 0.00049 1.39
BUSY + 0.02775 0.60
IFRS + 0.06348 1.59
DAX + 0.61071 *** 5.44
MDAX + 0.24333 ** 2.76
SDAX + 0.09102 * 1.92
TECDAX + 0.18646 *** 4.19
Firm Years
Adj. R2
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equation (1) as an 
ordinary least square regression that includes fixed effects for fiscal year and 
industry. The analysis employs heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors 
clustered by firm. The regression is estimated with an intercept included (not 
tabulated).  ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 










Variables expected sign Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
ABAFEE +/- -0.00751 -0.65 -0.01486 -1.01
DPABAFEE +/- -0.00731 -1.47 -0.01952 ** -2.24
PABAFEE +/- 0.02570 ** 2.96 0.05375 *** 2.64
LNTA - -0.00171 -0.88 0.00362 1.28
AGE - -0.00008 * -1.89 -0.00014 ** -2.34
BTM +/- -0.01035 ** -2.53 -0.00373 -0.74
GROWTH +/- 0.01273 1.52 0.02818 *** 3.00
ISSUE +/- 0.01271 * 1.83 0.01609 ** 2.53
CFO +/- 0.06291 *** 4.33 0.10647 *** 3.27
LOSS + 0.04342 *** 7.37 0.03318 *** 4.67
CHGLEVE + 0.02829 1.10 -0.01435 -0.45
ZSCORE + 0.00712 * 2.19 0.01088 *** 4.11
BIG5 - -0.00806 ** -2.74 -0.01453 ** -2.14
INITIAL + -0.00016 -0.03 -0.00186 -0.24





Results on the Association between           
Abnormal Audit Fees and Discretionary Accruals
|DA1| |DA2|
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equation (4) for |DA1| and |DA2|, respectively, as 
ordinary least square regressions that include fixed effects for fiscal year and industry. The analyses employ 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm. The regressions are estimated with an intercept 
included (not tabulated).  ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed 






Variable of Interest - Definition 
Variables expected sign Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
ABAFEE +/- -0.01280 1.17 -0.01581 -1.48 -0.00726 -0.87 -0.00537 -0.84
DPABAFEE +/- -0.00256 -0.54 0.00313 0.61 -0.00912 -1.39 -0.01575 -0.99
PABAFEE +/- 0.02856 *** 3.60 0.02516 *** 3.78 0.02717 *** 4.10 0.04143 * 1.84
LNTA - -0.00203 -1.12 -0.00196 -1.07 -0.00197 -1.10 -0.00181 -0.98
AGE - -0.00008 * -1.98 -0.00008 * -1.98 -0.00008 * -2.02 -0.00008 * -2.04
BTM +/- -0.01027 ** -3.13 -0.01020 ** -3.12 -0.01022 ** -3.13 -0.01018 ** -3.07
GROWTH +/- 0.01229 1.44 0.01244 1.45 0.01231 1.44 0.01235 1.43
ISSUE +/- 0.01503 ** 2.52 0.01502 ** 2.49 0.01502 ** 2.56 0.01501 ** 2.59
CFO +/- 0.06467 *** 4.51 0.06485 *** 4.59 0.06433 *** 4.52 0.06402 *** 4.51
LOSS + 0.04335 *** 8.14 0.04354 *** 8.28 0.04305 *** 8.21 0.04292 *** 8.17
CHGLEVE + 0.03462 1.38 0.03497 1.41 0.03458 1.37 0.03451 1.37
ZSCORE + 0.00640 * 1.93 0.00638 * 1.92 0.00644 * 1.93 0.00649 * 1.94
BIG5 - -0.00617 * -2.10 -0.00614 * -2.16 -0.00637 * -2.15 -0.00638 * -2.14
INITIAL + 0.00042 0.07 0.00044 0.07 0.00036 0.06 0.00036 0.06
LAGTACC +/- -0.09309 ** -3.21 -0.09330 *** -3.22 -0.09309 ** -3.20 -0.09310 ** -3.20
Firm Years
Adj. R2
PABAFEE ≥ 5% PABAFEE ≥ 10%
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equation (4) for |DA1| and different threshold levels of positive abnormal audit fees (see above) as ordinary least square regressions that include fixed effects 
for fiscal year and industry. The analyses employ heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm. The regressions are estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated).  ***, **, and * denote p-
value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
4 4 4 4
|DA1| |DA1| |DA1| |DA1|
Table 7
Sensitivity Analyses on the Association between Different Threshold Levels of Abnormal Audit Fees and |DA1|
0.1713 0.1715 0.1707 0.1706
2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334






Variables expected sign Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics Coefficient t-statistics
ABAFEE +/- -0.02061 -1.43 -0.02349 * -1.82 -0.02141 ** -1.99 -0.01959 ** -2.38
DPABAFEE +/- -0.01651 * -1.74 -0.01492 -1.52 -0.02531 ** -2.09 -0.02638 -0.89
PABAFEE +/- 0.06037 *** 2.96 0.06336 *** 3.02 0.07458 *** 3.11 0.07512 * 1.86
LNTA - 0.00478 * 1.83 0.00476 * 1.82 0.00475 * 1.83 0.00525 ** 2.01
AGE - -0.00016 *** -2.70 -0.00015 *** -2.68 -0.00016 *** -2.70 -0.00016 *** -2.73
BTM +/- -0.00251 -0.53 -0.00239 -0.50 -0.00232 -0.49 -0.00227 -0.48
GROWTH +/- 0.02733 *** 2.95 0.02738 *** 2.69 0.02734 *** 2.96 0.02732 *** 2.94
ISSUE +/- 0.01751 *** 2.68 0.01750 *** 2.69 0.01734 *** 2.67 0.01719 *** 2.63
CFO +/- 0.10931 *** 3.40 0.10951 *** 3.41 0.10891 *** 3.40 0.10781 *** 3.37
LOSS + 0.03540 *** 4.93 0.03568 *** 5.00 0.03531 *** 4.98 0.03495 *** 4.94
CHGLEVE + -0.00580 -0.18 -0.00538 -0.17 -0.00504 -0.16 -0.00540 -0.17
ZSCORE + 0.01020 *** 3.87 0.01015 *** 3.85 0.01013 *** 3.85 0.01025 *** 3.89
BIG5 - -0.00975 -1.48 -0.00966 -1.47 -0.00971 -1.48 -0.00960 -1.47
INITIAL + -0.00106 -0.14 -0.00097 -0.13 -0.00122 -0.16 -0.00125 -0.16
LAGTACC +/- -0.09872 *** -3.04 -0.09888 *** -3.04 -0.09946 *** -3.08 -0.09951 *** -3.05
Firm Years
Adj. R2
This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equation (4) for |DA2| and different threshold levels of positive abnormal audit fees (see above) as ordinary least square regressions that include fixed effects 
for fiscal year and industry. The analyses employ heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by firm. The regressions are estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated).  ***, **, and * denote p-
value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
0.1872 0.1868 0.1871 0.1871
2,334 2,334 2,334 2,334
|DA2| |DA2| |DA2| |DA2|
PABAFEE ≥ 1% PABAFEE ≥ 2% PABAFEE ≥ 5% PABAFEE ≥ 10%
Table 8
Sensitivity Analyses on the Association between Different Threshold Levels of Abnormal Audit Fees and |DA2|




Variables expected sign Coefficient z-statistics Coefficient z-statistics Coefficient z-statistics
ABAFEE +/- -1.06321 ** -2.29 0.28371 0.38 -0.78682 ** -2.49
DPABAFEE +/- 0.25734 0.59 -0.07601 -0.16 0.28121 1.17
PABAFEE +/- 1.28305 * 1.68 0.72911 0.83 1.06171 ** 2.23
LNTA +/- 0.20055 ** 2.26 0.06541 0.67 0.03693 0.38
AGE +/- -0.00366 -1.06 0.00368 1.27 0.00219 1.27
BTM +/- 0.22798 0.94 0.02524 0.12 -0.17904 -1.08
GROWTH +/- 0.17028 0.79 -0.49046 -1.49 0.13768 0.48
ISSUE +/- 0.07550 0.24 0.31052 0.99 -0.13910 -0.96
CFO +/- -0.83822 -1.13 0.59770 0.94 0.49947 1.45
LOSS + 0.49188 1.30 2.83660 *** 4.78 -1.00477 *** -4.90
CHGLEVE + -0.76680 -0.75 1.24611 1.59 -0.42186 -0.54
ZSCORE + 0.02068 0.23 0.12651 * 1.72 -0.20852 ** -2.34
BIG5 - -0.76987 ** -2.52 -0.05895 -0.21 0.34925 * 1.87
INITIAL + 0.62885 * 1.85 0.19417 0.50 0.20125 0.91
LNNFC - -0.05908 -0.43








This table shows the coefficients and t-statistics for estimating Equation (5) for RESTATE and FIRST_GCO, respectively, and Equation (6) for MBEX as 
logistic regressions that include fixed effects for fiscal year and industry. The analyses employ heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. The regressions are estimated with an intercept included (not tabulated).  ***, **, and * denote p-value significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, with 
two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.
Results on the Association between Abnormal Audit Fees and Alternative Audit Quality Measures
